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EARL WARD CLEMENTS,
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AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, BEFORE THE
HON. CALVIN GOULD, J.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------------- -------- ------------STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.
EARL WARD CLEMENTS,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

lliTRODUCTORYSTATEMENT
Defendant appeals from the finding of the court below, stttrng
wtthout a iury, of the conviction of second degree burglary, and from the
sentence of the court to the Utah State Prison.
The matter should be reversed without direction, or m the alternati.ve reversed and remanded .tor a new trial on the merits consistent with

procedural due process and consistent with a proper mdictment for the
crin1e committed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record on appeal consists of two volumes, one of which contains pleadings, minute entries and similar papers, together with and
numbered within the ftle separately, which ts the transcript of proceedings
upon the trial.

The other volume is a record of proceedings and the

minute entries made, filed at a later date, consisting of five unnwnbered

p«ges appearing to be the transcript of proceedings at the arraignment of
the defend;:rnt-aypellant.
nated by

References to the first volume will be desig-

(R. page number, Tr. page number).

References thus to the

record where they are made to the trial transcript will show a parallel
c Ltation, references to the record of proceedings for the arraignment and
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appear mg man unconnected and unnumbered volume will sunply be made
b~ genPral reierence to the supplemental record.

After serLOus objection (Supp. R.) as to the trial of the matter
concurrently, the learned trial judge raising the issue himself (R. 37,
Tr. 4), and after the questLOn was determined by the Honorable John
F. Wahlquist by his requirement to counsel that if the matter was to
proceed upon joint trial the office of the District Attorney was to present
a motion for consolidation (Supp. R. at 5), and it further appearing that
an ex parte motion to consolidate was filed together with an unsigned order
at (R. 14, 15). counsel apparently conceded m the concurrent trial.
The matter proceeded upon trial without a jury, the District
Attorney s office presenting its evidence in alternative cross-fire order
1

with respect to the co-defendant Peterson and back again with respect to
the defendant-appellant Clements.
The first witness called by the State testified briefly that he was
the admmistrator of the Ogden Clinic and knew generally who had keys to
the building and who didn't.

The building manager did not know either

of the defendants and prior to the date of trial had not seen either of them

be fore.

He further testified that to his knowledge they were not among

those authorized to be present during after hours (R. 39, 40, Tr. 6, 7).
The State's second witness, Patrolman Moore, testified that he
responded to a call the evening of April 18th, 1970, at 11. 21 p.m. and was
in the area so he went to inspect as a back-up man and was on the scene in

forty seconds.
found
42)."

1t

He testified that he, upon observmg the south side,

to be secure and

" . . . found all the windows secure. · . (Tr. at

Patrolman Moore then testified that he observed two men mside

the clmic at the pharmacy door by the illumination from the parking lot
lLghts shmmg mto the building and then later testified that the two defendants m the courtroom (some six months later) were the two men he ob-
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S<'

r vcd ms lde the Ogden Cl mic at the pharmacy door.

Patrolman Moore

d1d not observe the defendants accused the evemng of the alleged burglary
after h10 observation at the Ogden Clinic pharmacy door.

Patrolman

Moore was not present when the defendants were taken into custody (Tr. 12).
The next Stat<>'s w1tness, Sergeant Brooks, testified that he had
held over forty minutes from his shift end to assist

11

them".

(Tr. 13).

Sergeant Brooks searched the ground floor of the clinic together with
Officer Cragun, and Lt was m Cragun's presence that the defendantapp<>llant Clements was observed voluntarily coming out of a dead stair
space closet.

A rev1ew of the rather brief transcript of proceedmgs

md1cates that there was confus10n m the mind of Officer Cragun and of
Sergeant Brooks as to who placed Clements under arrest, and each of them
testified they thought that Sergeant Stettler had read Clements a Miranda
warning.

The other testifying officers had to do with the co-defendant

Pcten;on and none of them observed Clements on the scene or after the
The record does show that the defendants were present at night,

arrest.

ma place they apparently were not supposed to be.

There LS no ev1dence

as to any stolen property or intent to commit larceny.

A . 357 magnum

revolver was found m the approxilnate area of defendant-appellant Clements'
h1ding place but without reference to any identification, serial number,
finger prints, and there was no testLmony that Clements knew of its presence or exercised any dominion or control over the same.

The record

goes on to show as a justification by Officer Coleman for dragg1ng the codefendant Peterson along down the hall rn the furtherance of the officer's
search 1 0
found

111

-

trespassers that six cartridges of the . 357 rnangum type were

the defendant Peterson's pockets (Tr. 26, R. 59).

Exhibit A, . 357 mangun 1 revolver, Exhibit B,

Sl){

The State's

cartridges, and a

second. 357 revolver by st1pulat10n 10und rn the defendant-appellant
Cle1ne nt 51 automobile without regard to tts loca tLon,
received by the trial Judge as evidence.
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we re oife red and

i
The defendant-appellant Clements was found guilty and sentenced
to the Utah State Prison for a term of from one to twenty years and particular
ly charged with and found guilty of violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-9-3
(1969 Supp.).

The provision referred to is quoted in full text hereinbelow:

''Every person who forcibly breaks and enters, or without
force enters an open door, window or other aperture, of any
house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store,
mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, or any tent,
sheep or cattle camp, vessel, watercraft, railroad car, automobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or aircraft with intent
to commit larceny or any felony, ts guilty of burglary in the
second degree. 11
The above quoted statute was recently amended and the admittedly tenuous
distinction between daytune and nighttime is no longer tmportant with respect
to the degree of burglary committed.

The Legislature in its wisdom added

a new crune, that 1s, being somewhere one should not be, and is set forth 1n
76-9-9 (1969 Supp.) with the designation thereof "misdemeanor.

11

POINT I
---THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY
It is defendant-appellant's position that the amended statute with

regard to second degree burglary still requires, to be constitutionally
valid, a specific intent.

At common law and prior to the statutory

amendment discussed herein, the crime of burglary required a specific
mtent.
State,

Roberts v. State, 136 Tex. App. 138, 124 S. W. 128;
145 Tenn. 43, 389 S. W. 529.

to intent is well explained

tn

Hooks v.

The gist of the crime with regard

People v. Morton, 4 Utah 407, 11 Pac. 512

(188b), wherein the court concluded that a previous plan to commit larceny
taken together with a breaking and entering at night and burglary tools
consistmg of a drill bit and others, were sufficient to sustain the element
of the necessary larcenous or felonious intent.

It is conceded by

sary intent may be unplied from circwnappellant that proo f o f th e neces
ation, the possession of recently stolen
stances and by legislative declar
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property raLses the Lnference without a counter explanation.

Utah Code

Annotated, § 76-38-1 (1953).
The record m the mstant proceedmgs shows only that the accused
was found ma place he wasn't supposed to be - that ts all~

Even though

one officer stayed twenty mtnutes past the end of hts shift to "asstst them"
and further that wtthm flve minutes there were etght patrol cars on the
scene, the record falls to disclose any evLdence of burglary or tools,
there was no stolen property, and it LS not even clear who arrested the

defendant-appellant Clements.
This Court as a reviewing court should not arbitrarily tamper
with evidence or proof where there is conflict m test=ony and particularly
where there has been a jury determinat10n.

In the Lnstant case, however,

the conviction and the necessary facts to sustaLn that conviction were found

by the court and not by a jury, and it is vigorously argued by appellant
Clements that, as in the case of State v. Pratt, 25 Utah 2d. 76, 475 Pac.
Zd 1013 (1970), this Court could review the record as a whole and should
reverse where the prosecutor's case in chief, the testimony taken as a

whole, ts wholly tnsuffictent to prove the crime as charged.

In State v.

Pratt, supra, at page 1014 of the Pacific Reporter, this Court observed
. that defendant's presence at the scene of a wrongdoing is msufflcient to show his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. "
Uthe applicable law relating to the crlffie of second degree burglar
requires as part of the prosecutor's case Ln chief, a proof beyond reason-

able doubt of a specific intent to commit larceny or some other felony,
the delc-adant-appellant Clements is and was justified
evidence of mtoxicat10n at the time m his own behalf.

in

not presenting
The officers

who observed Clements emerge from his hidmg place did not volunteer
The defendant-appellant Clements

these facts, nor where they asked.

was represented by counsel at the trial, and who could not reasonably
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have been anticipating a convictlOn and not reasonably faLling to adduce or
elicit testimony with respect to Clements 1 intoxication at the ti.zne, dLd not
raise any facts Ln regard to Clernents 1 mtox1cation.

It is not clear from

the present amendment to the statute relating to second degree burglary
whether the legislative mtent to abandon the specific mtent relating to
burglary LS made an element of the crilne or not.

POINT II
THE STATUTE UPON WHICH CONVICTION WAS MADE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
ITS REQUIREMENTS BEING AMBIGUOUS, VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN
The requirement that a penal provision or enactment by the people
the violation of which may be the subject of ilnprcsonment, must set forth
with particularcty the acts or conduct making the elements of the crilne
well known to the publ1c at large.

This LS so in the mst!illt case by virtue

of the record fa1ling to reflect the otherwise ava1lable defense of heavy
intoxication which, prlOr to the amendment to the second degree burglary
statute, would have been an absolute defense.

If counsel for defendant

Clements did not ra1se the defense because by the terms of the statute it
was so ambiguous as to whether or not it would be a valid defense, and
whether or not the court on its own motion should have inquired into the
state of mind of defendant, and whether or not the prosecutor and his
witnesses had a duty to do so, is all uncertain and unclear by the very
terms of the statute with which defendant was charged.

If the legislative

intent with respect to the statutory amendment for second degree burglary
was to eliminate the requirement of specific intent, then it is submitted

that at common law the gist of the crime of burglary was the breaking of
a place of storage of chattels or man's habitat with felonious intent at
the time of entry, that the crime of second degree burglary must still
require the necessary larcenous intent.
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It LS submitted that voluntary

intoxication is no defense to a cri.cne that does not require a specific intent.

The concept 1s broadly expressed and stated m Nieto v. People, 383 Pac.
2d 321 (Colo. 1963).

In the case of State v. Turner

3 Utah 2d 28 5, 282

Pac. 2d 1045 (1955), this Court affirmed the conv1ctwn where assigned
error was based on a failure to instruct on defense of intoxication, the

Court concluding that the crime of sodomy did not require a specific intent
as an element of the crime.

That voluntary intoxication or severe and

uncontrolled hallucinations caused by intoxication and other factors not
completely within the control of defendant are recognized as a valid defense
to the crime of burglary is recognized m State v. Pellay, 7 Utah 2d 308,
324 Pac. 2d 490 (1958), wherein great weight withm the record and submltted separately to the JUry was whether or not, m view of his drinkmg,
the defendant had entered for an mnocent or a felonious purpose.

The

rule of law 1n this state 1s set forth quite clearly citing previous cases
dealing with first degree murder wh1ch 1 also require a specific intent 1
rn State

v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123,

396 Pac. 2d 749 (1964) as follows:

''Thus a night tune forcible entry to a houseJ or an entry
without force through an open door, with mtent to commit
larceny, is second degree burglary.
But, if on account
of voluntary mtoxication the accused did not have the necessary mtent to commit larceny, the iury should take mto
consideration the evidence of intoxication in determining
the existence of the necessary mtent (396 Pac. 2d at 750)."
1

It 1s submitted by appellant herein that because of the ambiguity

of the statute presently relating to second degree burglary, conviction could
now or then be had without proof of specific mtent, then the defense of the
md was reasonably and Justifiably not made
d<>fe ndant - a ppe Hant' s state Of m
a part of the record below.
That this Court should consider or remand for a new trial the
basic argwnents raised herein do not absolve defendant-appellant from
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his acts completely but simply do not present a case for the commission
of the crime with which defendant was conv1cte
·
d and sentenced to prison.
In reversing the conviction of first degree murder and ordering
a new trial, this Court recognized its duty with regard to prejudicial errors

not previously assigned or argued m the record below as follows;
" · · .. yet thi.s Court . . . may and should sua sponte
consider manifest and prejudicial errors which are neither
assigned nor argued.
State v. Stenback, 2 Pac. 2d 1050
(Utah 1931); State v. Riley, 41 Utah 225, 126 Pac. 294
( 1911). "
In State v. Stenback, supra,

the Supreme Court of the State of

Utah at 2 Pac. 2d 1054 observed with regard to mtox1cation that:
11
•••
1£ at the time of the commission of such an offense
the accused was by mtoxication so entirely deprived of his
reason that he did not have the mental capacity to entertain the necessary specific intent which ts required to
constitute a cri..rne, he must necessarily be acquitted;
and in like manner the fact of defendant's drunkenness
should be considered in determining the degree of the
cri..rne.
This ts so, not because drunkenness excuses
c r Lme but because if the mental status required by law to
constitute crime be one of specific intent or of deliberation and premeditation, and drunkenness excludes the
existence of such mental state, then the particular crllne
charged has not m fact been committed."

POINT III
-----THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS RESULTING IN THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE SO FRAUGHT
WITH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ERROR THAT
THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT WERE MATERIALLY
PREJUDICED
Defendant-appellant Clements did not raise the defense of
intoxLcation 1n the proceedings below, nor d1d his counsel move for a new

trial.

Defendant's state of mind was affected both by voluntary consump-

t1on of liquor and the imb1bement of drugs causmg a state of mind undefinable but clearly absolving any mtent necessary if the crime was still
requirement of the degree of intent prior to the statutory amendment.

It ls submitted that there is a direct pecuniary conflict of interest wherein
defense counsel could not consistently ask the court for a new trial with
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respect to certain evtdence being preserved ior the payment of his fee

(R. 76, 77, Tr. 43, 44).
It is to be further noted that the defense was not within the
an1bient of

11

newly discovered evidence

11

necessary to preserve defendantrs

mot10n lor a new trial beyond the time limits set forth in Utah Code Annotated, § 77-38-4 (1953).

The failure to move for a new trial and present cowisel 1 s
mabiltty to do so is further compounded by the procedural error m
transmitting the record herein to the Supreme Court which, by recent
amendment to the Code of Crimmal Procedure, requires that such record
be transmitted within thirty days after filing of Notice of Appeal, when,
m fact, the record was held up in the Second Judicial District Clerk's
office for approximately seventy days.
Appellant is not unmindful of the general principle of mere
errors 1n procedure cannot be treated as a denial of due process (Gruger

v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 (1948).

The i.nstant case, however, involves

the application of a recently amended penal statute, it mvolves procedural
errors constituting a sixty day delay m transmitting the record on appeal,
and it further involves a maxinnun prison sentence of twenty years.

Pre-

sent coW1sel is concerned with the joint trial when there was never any

order signed m the record allowing tor such consolidation, and with the
discussion with previous tr1al counsel the apparent continuing of the trial

at the request of the District Attorney of the Second Judicial District m
order not to insure a ia1r resolution of the facts or whether the crime had

been committed, but in order to insure that the defendants would not be
r0leased on a writ of habeas corpus.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted by appellant-defendant Clements
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that m order to comply with the minimal requirements of procedural due
process and fairness, the matter should be reversed and remanded wLth

a view to construing the statute under which he was convicted as not changmg the elements of the crime of second degree burglary as they existed
at common law and upon the enactment of the United States Constitution
and thus allowing him, where the office of the prosecuting attorney below
did not feel a duty to do so, to present his defense of state of mind proving
beyond doubt that the crime was not, rn fact, committed.
Respectfully submitted,

'-John R. Anderson
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

Dated:

Mayllth, 1971
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